I think that some things exist which are almost certainly wholly or partially constructed, some which are almost certainly not, and some the status of which one cannot currently determine with any certainty.
In the first category lie ideological concepts and concepts people impose on reality to explain it - patriotism, nations, race, systems of temporal and spatial measurement, mathematics, etc. These may be grounded in reality, but they themselves are totally apart from it; the idea of nations may stem from humans' primitive urges to mark out territory, but the idea itself does not exist anywhere except in constructed ideological space - a 'nation' is not a physical thing, or an urge, even if it exists because of one.
In the second is a large part of the external world. While of course fallibility, as always, is an undeniable possibility, discarding that I believe one can be relatively certain that the world exists. One does not really have any reason to doubt its existence. Most people think, at least, that they can tell the difference between dreams and reality, and while they possess no method of proving that they are not asleep, they have no particular reason to think they are. Furthermore, other people seem to exist as well. One cannot accurately predict their actions, read their thoughts, or cause them to comply with one's wishes if they do not want to. Certainly, the wills and minds of others could actually be hidden parts of one's own psyche, subconscious parts, but this seems far-fetched, and once more, there is no especial reason to believe it is so - while there is reason to believe it is not (one's experience of the world).
The last category contains the actual thing that is (or is not, if it does not exist) time, some deities, and some sensory perceptions. As I still have no idea what time actually is, I do not know if it exists or not, is constructed or not. Certain deities (and imaginary objects or concepts) have unknowability included in their definitions - this sets them apart from material objects, or imaginary objects. While I can say with a certain level of confidence that the material chair upon which I am sitting exists (since the definition of a material chairs says that if I am sitting on it I should be able to feel it, see it, etc.) and that there is no material chair on my head (because, by the same definition, I should be able to experience it with my senses if it does), I cannot say whether a transcendent, immaterial chair, undetectable by any means known to humanity, is on my head. I have no particular reason to believe that it is - I also have no particular reason to believe that it is not. Yes, I have never encountered such a chair before to my knowledge, nor anything like it, but of course I would not have known if I did because it would have been undetectable!
I cannot think of anything which does not fit into one of the above three categories. If anyone else can, please feel free (more than free - invited!) to comment.
Sunday, December 16, 2012
Not Just Useless
In response to Tom Leidenfrost's post "Refusing One's Nature with Pharmaceuticals?" (12/14/2012):
While I believe that cases exist wherein using medication is the best option for a person, I agree that in many situations medication is both unnecessary and harmful.
Extreme mental abnormalities, such as severe hallucinatory schizophrenia or debilitating OCD, may so impair an individual's ability to perceive and interact with the world that they cannot function at all independently without the aid of pharmaceutical substances. In cases such as these - wherein abnormalities are so extreme they may genuinely be called disorders or illnessess, as they cause just as much inconvenience and difficulty as physical illnesses - I think that taking medication is perfectly alright, or even advisable.
Other mental abnormalities, however, such as ADHD, and the now-defunct asperger syndrome, do not usually deprive individuals entirely of their autonomy. They may make life more difficult to navigate, but they do not demand treatment in the same way that more extreme abnormalities do. I do not think that most people with these abnormalities require medication, and might in fact benefit greatly from avoiding it. As well as being unnecessary, medication can have notable harmful effects. Many medications do have physical risks attached to them, but in addition, some may have mental risks which are not stated 'on the bottle,' so to speak.
A friend of mine is a karate instructor for young children. On more than one occasion she has told me stories about a few of her students who were diagnosed with ADHD and began, due to their parents' decisions, taking medication for it. Prior to taking medication these students were quite hyperactive and did not pay attention in class - they had fun, but did not really learn anything. After beginning medication, they were calm and somewhat detached. Sometimes they seemed almost asleep on their feet. They still did not learn anything, and now they did not have fun either.
Obviously, medication does not have this sort of dramatic effect in every case. However, especially when children take it because of their parents' decisions rather than their own, I think it is ethically problematic. Instead of medicating children to make them cooperative, why don't schools implement longer research periods and less class hours? Why don't parents pay attention to their children at home, instead of giving them a pill when they make noise and trouble to gain attention? The most highly lauded school systems in the world all have considerably shorter class hours and longer research times than American schools; not only do these countries have a more educated populace, they also have a much lower ADHD rate. I think that over-medication is definitely a problem, and that there are many alternatives to pharmaceuticals which are under-used and under-known, especially in America.
While I believe that cases exist wherein using medication is the best option for a person, I agree that in many situations medication is both unnecessary and harmful.
Extreme mental abnormalities, such as severe hallucinatory schizophrenia or debilitating OCD, may so impair an individual's ability to perceive and interact with the world that they cannot function at all independently without the aid of pharmaceutical substances. In cases such as these - wherein abnormalities are so extreme they may genuinely be called disorders or illnessess, as they cause just as much inconvenience and difficulty as physical illnesses - I think that taking medication is perfectly alright, or even advisable.
Other mental abnormalities, however, such as ADHD, and the now-defunct asperger syndrome, do not usually deprive individuals entirely of their autonomy. They may make life more difficult to navigate, but they do not demand treatment in the same way that more extreme abnormalities do. I do not think that most people with these abnormalities require medication, and might in fact benefit greatly from avoiding it. As well as being unnecessary, medication can have notable harmful effects. Many medications do have physical risks attached to them, but in addition, some may have mental risks which are not stated 'on the bottle,' so to speak.
A friend of mine is a karate instructor for young children. On more than one occasion she has told me stories about a few of her students who were diagnosed with ADHD and began, due to their parents' decisions, taking medication for it. Prior to taking medication these students were quite hyperactive and did not pay attention in class - they had fun, but did not really learn anything. After beginning medication, they were calm and somewhat detached. Sometimes they seemed almost asleep on their feet. They still did not learn anything, and now they did not have fun either.
Obviously, medication does not have this sort of dramatic effect in every case. However, especially when children take it because of their parents' decisions rather than their own, I think it is ethically problematic. Instead of medicating children to make them cooperative, why don't schools implement longer research periods and less class hours? Why don't parents pay attention to their children at home, instead of giving them a pill when they make noise and trouble to gain attention? The most highly lauded school systems in the world all have considerably shorter class hours and longer research times than American schools; not only do these countries have a more educated populace, they also have a much lower ADHD rate. I think that over-medication is definitely a problem, and that there are many alternatives to pharmaceuticals which are under-used and under-known, especially in America.
Sunday, December 9, 2012
Q&A 7, Second Answer
My question is: Is any social group inherently disadvantaged in
its ability to view the world objectively?
I think that the answer to this question depends on how one defines a 'social group.' I believe that people with certain statuses may have disadvantages in ability to know objectively. For example, people affected by the variety of schizophrenia which produces hallucinations may not have access to the world in as accurate a way as they would were they not affected by the schizophrenia. Similarly, a person who has not had access to education, but has instead been brainwashed by people holding a highly warped view of reality, might process information in a way which is not ideal in terms of objectivity.
However, do 'people with a particular form of schizophrenia' or 'people without access to education who were raised in a very close-minded, ideologically devout environment' really comprise social groups? The dictionary definition of 'social group' is 'group of people sharing a social relation,' but that is very vague, and the meaning of 'social relation' is also vague. Upon further research, I learned that 'social relation' means 'a relation between two living organisms, particularly humans.' 'Relation' is a very vague term with multiple meanings. As such, I cannot formulate a clear definition of social group, and as such do not think I am qualified to really answer this question.
I think that the answer to this question depends on how one defines a 'social group.' I believe that people with certain statuses may have disadvantages in ability to know objectively. For example, people affected by the variety of schizophrenia which produces hallucinations may not have access to the world in as accurate a way as they would were they not affected by the schizophrenia. Similarly, a person who has not had access to education, but has instead been brainwashed by people holding a highly warped view of reality, might process information in a way which is not ideal in terms of objectivity.
However, do 'people with a particular form of schizophrenia' or 'people without access to education who were raised in a very close-minded, ideologically devout environment' really comprise social groups? The dictionary definition of 'social group' is 'group of people sharing a social relation,' but that is very vague, and the meaning of 'social relation' is also vague. Upon further research, I learned that 'social relation' means 'a relation between two living organisms, particularly humans.' 'Relation' is a very vague term with multiple meanings. As such, I cannot formulate a clear definition of social group, and as such do not think I am qualified to really answer this question.
Q&A 7, First Answer
My question is: While social status may not give one access to a
special way of knowing the world, is there any status (perhaps as an autistic
person or a person with synaesthesia) which can?
To some extent, I believe that statuses which affect a person's perception (whether by changing their physical ability to receive information from the world or by changing their ability to process that information) can give them a unique way of knowing the world. However, I do not think that this necessarily gives them any sort of privilege. Furthermore, it is not only people with such statuses who know the world differently - everyone perceives the world in a slightly different way. The way someone sees a single object can vary according to millions of factors: their height, the ration of rods to cones in their eyes, whether their hair is in their face at the time, and so on. I think that the important point here is that, while everyone knows the world in a different way (and some people's ways may be more unusual than those of others), none of those ways are necessarily privileged or special.
To some extent, I believe that statuses which affect a person's perception (whether by changing their physical ability to receive information from the world or by changing their ability to process that information) can give them a unique way of knowing the world. However, I do not think that this necessarily gives them any sort of privilege. Furthermore, it is not only people with such statuses who know the world differently - everyone perceives the world in a slightly different way. The way someone sees a single object can vary according to millions of factors: their height, the ration of rods to cones in their eyes, whether their hair is in their face at the time, and so on. I think that the important point here is that, while everyone knows the world in a different way (and some people's ways may be more unusual than those of others), none of those ways are necessarily privileged or special.
Sunday, December 2, 2012
Puzzle Pieces
In response to Brandon's post "Intersectionality" (12/2/2012):
The idea of identifying as a 'humanist' is intriguing and, I believe, wise. However, are all smaller-category labels harmful? I would argue that they are not. Labels such as feminism and masculism have two components - firstly, they apply to a certain issue (gender inequality) and secondly, they take up a certain side on that issue (women's rights or men's rights, respectively). The second part is, I think, most definitely a problem, because it excludes people. Masculism, by focusing only on men's rights, ignores women, and feminism does the reverse. One cannot benefit from both, since (currently) society recognizes each person as only a man or only a woman.
The first part, on the other hand, does not seem problematic. Gender inequality effects all people because all people have a gender orientation - even agendered people are distinguishable by their lack of gender. By addressing the issue of gender equality, one is not excluding anyone, although one might well be ignoring various other issues. I think that choosing labels for different issues can help people by breaking down the vast conglomeration of social ills facing today's society into manageable chunks without excluding anyone. While the ideal social activist is aware of all inequalities and works to right them, in reality it is very difficult for someone to effectively advocate for everything at once. Instead, people usually specialise, supporting the rights of all people but putting the majority of their efforts into eliminating inequality based on one factor. Thus, while I promote the extinction of exclusive labels, like feminism and masculism, or gay rights and queer rights, I support the existence of inclusive but issue-specific labels, such as gender egalitarianism or non-discrimination regarding sexuality. I also like the idea of an umbrella label, like human rights, to increase awareness of the multitude of issues while not forcing anyone to attempt to spread their effort out too thinly.
The idea of identifying as a 'humanist' is intriguing and, I believe, wise. However, are all smaller-category labels harmful? I would argue that they are not. Labels such as feminism and masculism have two components - firstly, they apply to a certain issue (gender inequality) and secondly, they take up a certain side on that issue (women's rights or men's rights, respectively). The second part is, I think, most definitely a problem, because it excludes people. Masculism, by focusing only on men's rights, ignores women, and feminism does the reverse. One cannot benefit from both, since (currently) society recognizes each person as only a man or only a woman.
The first part, on the other hand, does not seem problematic. Gender inequality effects all people because all people have a gender orientation - even agendered people are distinguishable by their lack of gender. By addressing the issue of gender equality, one is not excluding anyone, although one might well be ignoring various other issues. I think that choosing labels for different issues can help people by breaking down the vast conglomeration of social ills facing today's society into manageable chunks without excluding anyone. While the ideal social activist is aware of all inequalities and works to right them, in reality it is very difficult for someone to effectively advocate for everything at once. Instead, people usually specialise, supporting the rights of all people but putting the majority of their efforts into eliminating inequality based on one factor. Thus, while I promote the extinction of exclusive labels, like feminism and masculism, or gay rights and queer rights, I support the existence of inclusive but issue-specific labels, such as gender egalitarianism or non-discrimination regarding sexuality. I also like the idea of an umbrella label, like human rights, to increase awareness of the multitude of issues while not forcing anyone to attempt to spread their effort out too thinly.
Seeing Differently - Sex-based Advantages
The articles we read for class suggested that certain groups - in the reading, specifically women - have an advantage in seeing the world objectively. While I do not agree with the articles' reasoning, I do think that sex-based advantages exist, and that it would be a mistake to attempt to erase these from existence.
For example, many people are outraged by the rarity of female engineers and mathematicians. Less well-known, but still just as marked, is the rarity of male clothing designers and decorators. While some of this employment inequality is certainly societal, some of it may be biologically based. Research has suggested that, due to mental structures, men have a tendency to be better than women at mathematics (although this is far from a rule, of course; many women are very good at math, and many men are very bad) and women, due to optical structures, tend to have better colour perception than men (although, again, this is not universal. Some men have excellent colour perception, and some women have a lot of difficulty distinguishing colours) - women really do see differently from men. These tendencies skew various careers in favour of one gender or another.
Due to this, I think that efforts to balance careers by gender - trying to force various career workforces to be composed of 50% and 50% men (or a little less of each, allowing for non-binary people) - ignores the fact that there really are sex-based differences, and would probably result in an overall less skilled workforce, and potential employees would be excluded on the grounds of their genders. Nor, however, do I think that employers should base their employee choosing on assumptions about which gender will be better at the particular job they need to do - this would also result in a less skilled workforce, as most sex-based tendencies are not all that strong, and have many exceptions. Instead, I think that employers should evaluate people based on their individual abilities.
For example, many people are outraged by the rarity of female engineers and mathematicians. Less well-known, but still just as marked, is the rarity of male clothing designers and decorators. While some of this employment inequality is certainly societal, some of it may be biologically based. Research has suggested that, due to mental structures, men have a tendency to be better than women at mathematics (although this is far from a rule, of course; many women are very good at math, and many men are very bad) and women, due to optical structures, tend to have better colour perception than men (although, again, this is not universal. Some men have excellent colour perception, and some women have a lot of difficulty distinguishing colours) - women really do see differently from men. These tendencies skew various careers in favour of one gender or another.
Due to this, I think that efforts to balance careers by gender - trying to force various career workforces to be composed of 50% and 50% men (or a little less of each, allowing for non-binary people) - ignores the fact that there really are sex-based differences, and would probably result in an overall less skilled workforce, and potential employees would be excluded on the grounds of their genders. Nor, however, do I think that employers should base their employee choosing on assumptions about which gender will be better at the particular job they need to do - this would also result in a less skilled workforce, as most sex-based tendencies are not all that strong, and have many exceptions. Instead, I think that employers should evaluate people based on their individual abilities.
Flawed Labels
In response to Skyla's post "Feminism vs. Masculinism" (12/2/2012):
I think that both feminism and masculinism (or masculism) are unfortunately biased. Feminism, as determined by its linguistic roots and the actions and views of the majority of feminists, focuses on fixing social issues by granting women more rights, so that they will not have less rights than men in any area. However, feminism neglects areas in which men are less privileged than women, such as in cases of criminal law, child custody, and sexual assault prevention. Masculism (contrary to what Skyla says in her article; she may have unknowingly gone to a radical site and obtained misleading information) focuses on remedying the ways in which men have less rights than women - including, but not limited to, the areas I mentioned above. However, it does nothing about areas in which women are less privileged than men.
Thus, I believe that both views are severely lacking. Both labels, in addition, are tainted by their linkage to significant numbers of radicals - radical feminists who believe that men have no problems (or deserve the ones which they do have), are evil and inferior to women, and as such must be reduced to a lesser state in society, and radical masculists who believe that women are taking over the world, or that the misogynistic culture of the American past was the ideal society. Some people attempt to compensate for the lacking areas in both feminism and masculism by identifying with both labels, but this ignores the existence of people outside the gender binary, such as agendered, androgynous, or genderqueer individuals. These obvious deficiencies in feminism and masculism are why I choose to identify as a gender egalitarian.
I think that both feminism and masculinism (or masculism) are unfortunately biased. Feminism, as determined by its linguistic roots and the actions and views of the majority of feminists, focuses on fixing social issues by granting women more rights, so that they will not have less rights than men in any area. However, feminism neglects areas in which men are less privileged than women, such as in cases of criminal law, child custody, and sexual assault prevention. Masculism (contrary to what Skyla says in her article; she may have unknowingly gone to a radical site and obtained misleading information) focuses on remedying the ways in which men have less rights than women - including, but not limited to, the areas I mentioned above. However, it does nothing about areas in which women are less privileged than men.
Thus, I believe that both views are severely lacking. Both labels, in addition, are tainted by their linkage to significant numbers of radicals - radical feminists who believe that men have no problems (or deserve the ones which they do have), are evil and inferior to women, and as such must be reduced to a lesser state in society, and radical masculists who believe that women are taking over the world, or that the misogynistic culture of the American past was the ideal society. Some people attempt to compensate for the lacking areas in both feminism and masculism by identifying with both labels, but this ignores the existence of people outside the gender binary, such as agendered, androgynous, or genderqueer individuals. These obvious deficiencies in feminism and masculism are why I choose to identify as a gender egalitarian.
Sunday, November 25, 2012
Logic vs. Intuition - Not the Same Thing!
In response to Skyla Seamans' post "Women's Logic?" (11/23/2012):
I think that the so-called 'women's logic' the authors refer to may be intuition, or perhaps emotion. There are some philosophers who believe that women have an inherent moral compass, 'women's intuition,' or 'knowing through emotion,' which men do not possess and which provides a reliable guide for how to live one's life. This belief leads to theories like care ethics. I think that in most cases, so-called 'women's logic' is simply an excuse for people to impose their own views without critically analysing them. There is no evidence that women are incapable of or inferior at thinking critically, and little to no evidence that emotions are a reliable basis for learning the truth or acting morally. As such, unless supporters of this theory can provide more convincing evidence for their claims, I will disregard the idea of 'women's logic' as separate from normal logic.
I think that the so-called 'women's logic' the authors refer to may be intuition, or perhaps emotion. There are some philosophers who believe that women have an inherent moral compass, 'women's intuition,' or 'knowing through emotion,' which men do not possess and which provides a reliable guide for how to live one's life. This belief leads to theories like care ethics. I think that in most cases, so-called 'women's logic' is simply an excuse for people to impose their own views without critically analysing them. There is no evidence that women are incapable of or inferior at thinking critically, and little to no evidence that emotions are a reliable basis for learning the truth or acting morally. As such, unless supporters of this theory can provide more convincing evidence for their claims, I will disregard the idea of 'women's logic' as separate from normal logic.
Ism Backlash
In response to Carrisa Sacherski's post "Response to Avery's Post" (11/25/2012):
We have a positive chain of blog posts going on here! Huzzah!
At the end of her post, Carrisa mentions that 'isms' of any kind can create preconceived notions of a group of people. I think that this is absolutely true, and is furthermore a rarely-explored downside to even positive 'isms.' In fact, I think that it provides a way for positive 'isms' to become negative ones.
The evolution of the term 'feminism' is a good example of this phenomenon. Originally, 'feminism' meant simply 'a movement to promote the rights of women so that they are equal to those of men' - a movement with a fine goal, certainly. Early feminists also appear to have recognised that in order for women to have access to the same privileges as men, they would also have to take on the same responsibilities. However, as feminism gained followers and achieved many successes, it gained a more sinister connotation in addition to the initial positive one. While there are many feminists today who still hold to the original goal of the feminist movement, there are also many - perhaps more - who have changed the goal to one of superiority for women. Such people (sometimes referred to as radfems by the rational members of the feminist movement) ignore issues of men's rights, and wish for women to exercise the same privileges as men without any of the responsibilities. They give rational feminists a bad name, and have become so prevalent that their particular variety of 'feminism' is no longer a discredited oddball offshoot. In fact, they have so corrupted the term that many people who support the idea of equal rights for people of all genders have abandoned it and adopted other labels, such as 'gender egalitarian' or 'gender equalist.'
This example, I think, vividly illustrates the transformation of an indisputably positive 'ism' into a much more morally debatable one.
We have a positive chain of blog posts going on here! Huzzah!
At the end of her post, Carrisa mentions that 'isms' of any kind can create preconceived notions of a group of people. I think that this is absolutely true, and is furthermore a rarely-explored downside to even positive 'isms.' In fact, I think that it provides a way for positive 'isms' to become negative ones.
The evolution of the term 'feminism' is a good example of this phenomenon. Originally, 'feminism' meant simply 'a movement to promote the rights of women so that they are equal to those of men' - a movement with a fine goal, certainly. Early feminists also appear to have recognised that in order for women to have access to the same privileges as men, they would also have to take on the same responsibilities. However, as feminism gained followers and achieved many successes, it gained a more sinister connotation in addition to the initial positive one. While there are many feminists today who still hold to the original goal of the feminist movement, there are also many - perhaps more - who have changed the goal to one of superiority for women. Such people (sometimes referred to as radfems by the rational members of the feminist movement) ignore issues of men's rights, and wish for women to exercise the same privileges as men without any of the responsibilities. They give rational feminists a bad name, and have become so prevalent that their particular variety of 'feminism' is no longer a discredited oddball offshoot. In fact, they have so corrupted the term that many people who support the idea of equal rights for people of all genders have abandoned it and adopted other labels, such as 'gender egalitarian' or 'gender equalist.'
This example, I think, vividly illustrates the transformation of an indisputably positive 'ism' into a much more morally debatable one.
Sunday, November 18, 2012
Positive 'Isms'
In response to Carrisa Sacherski's post "To End All Isms" (11/18/2012):
In her post, Carrisa argues that if everyone thought critically, negative 'isms,' like racism and sexism, would disappear. I think it is possible to extend that concept to all 'isms' apart from non-normative ones (such as constructivism or Hinduism).
Today's so-called positive 'isms,' such as gender egalitarianism (or equalism) or cultural relativism, only exist in response to negative social conditions. If gender-based discrimination did not exist, gender egalitarianism would not need to exist as a concept; it would simply be the default state for everyone. If people were open to other cultures' traditions, they would not have to invent a special term for this recognition of cultural differences. This, in combination with the point Carrisa makes in her post, would lead to the elimination of all normative 'isms.'
Some words with that suffix would remain, but they would not connect directly to ethics. Religions such as Judaism would probably still exist; but without religiously based discrimination, they would have no positive or negative value. Philosophical viewpoints such as realism or fallibilism would also exist; these might have an indirect connection to ethics, in that they might imply different things about how one should live, but they themselves would not be viewpoints on ethics.
In her post, Carrisa argues that if everyone thought critically, negative 'isms,' like racism and sexism, would disappear. I think it is possible to extend that concept to all 'isms' apart from non-normative ones (such as constructivism or Hinduism).
Today's so-called positive 'isms,' such as gender egalitarianism (or equalism) or cultural relativism, only exist in response to negative social conditions. If gender-based discrimination did not exist, gender egalitarianism would not need to exist as a concept; it would simply be the default state for everyone. If people were open to other cultures' traditions, they would not have to invent a special term for this recognition of cultural differences. This, in combination with the point Carrisa makes in her post, would lead to the elimination of all normative 'isms.'
Some words with that suffix would remain, but they would not connect directly to ethics. Religions such as Judaism would probably still exist; but without religiously based discrimination, they would have no positive or negative value. Philosophical viewpoints such as realism or fallibilism would also exist; these might have an indirect connection to ethics, in that they might imply different things about how one should live, but they themselves would not be viewpoints on ethics.
Necessary Combination
I think that critical thinking without critical pedagogy is frequently useless, and critical pedagogy without critical thinking is dangerous.
Critical thinking requires one to critically analyse one's beliefs and ideals, subjecting them to objective logical scrutiny and determining their validity based on set, rational rules. However, it does not require one to act on one's conclusions. It is true that if one thinks critically about ethics one might conclude that it is ethical to do what is right and act on one's beliefs, particularly to intervene in unethical behaviour, but that critical thinking does not contain a normative value. One might reach the above conclusion, but not be appropriately moved to act upon it. Thus, all of one's critical thinking was useless.
Critical pedagogy requires one to identify injustice in society and work to right it and to teach others to right it. However, a follower of critical pedagogy might base their assumptions regarding which social groups are being subjected to injustice on unreliable criteria. The fact that a group is discriminated against does not necessitate that the discrimination is unjust, and groups can be minorities or 'underdogs' for very good reasons. Thus, a follower of critical pedagogy who was not a critical thinker might end up aiding a group which perpetrated very unethical behaviour.
For this reason, I believe that critical pedagogy and critical thinking must work together in one's life to produce the best results. The analytical power of critical thinking combined with the impetus of critical pedagogy can lead one to aid society and generally act in an ethical manner. Alone, neither critical thinking nor critical pedagogy is necessarily sufficient to fulfil this goal.
Critical thinking requires one to critically analyse one's beliefs and ideals, subjecting them to objective logical scrutiny and determining their validity based on set, rational rules. However, it does not require one to act on one's conclusions. It is true that if one thinks critically about ethics one might conclude that it is ethical to do what is right and act on one's beliefs, particularly to intervene in unethical behaviour, but that critical thinking does not contain a normative value. One might reach the above conclusion, but not be appropriately moved to act upon it. Thus, all of one's critical thinking was useless.
Critical pedagogy requires one to identify injustice in society and work to right it and to teach others to right it. However, a follower of critical pedagogy might base their assumptions regarding which social groups are being subjected to injustice on unreliable criteria. The fact that a group is discriminated against does not necessitate that the discrimination is unjust, and groups can be minorities or 'underdogs' for very good reasons. Thus, a follower of critical pedagogy who was not a critical thinker might end up aiding a group which perpetrated very unethical behaviour.
For this reason, I believe that critical pedagogy and critical thinking must work together in one's life to produce the best results. The analytical power of critical thinking combined with the impetus of critical pedagogy can lead one to aid society and generally act in an ethical manner. Alone, neither critical thinking nor critical pedagogy is necessarily sufficient to fulfil this goal.
Sunday, November 11, 2012
Best Guesses
As people do not have objective knowledge about what is right and wrong, they must base their ethical systems on a combination of reason and intuition. Mass intuitions are, except in a few specific circumstances, presumably more reliable than individual intuitions. This does not mean that mass intuitions, or mass beliefs, are fool-proof - it is entirely possible that every single person in the world could believe something false. The past provides evidence that this is extremely unlikely, however.
It is also entirely possible that trees are pancakes and dogs fly around with jet engines. This is also extremely unlikely, and relatively few people dispute that one may safely act on the assumption that what one observes is roughly equivalent to reality. It seems no less justifiable to incorporate mass intuition into one's code of ethics. In the end, all 'knowledge' is based upon certain unprovable assumptions - why must ethics be any different?
It is also entirely possible that trees are pancakes and dogs fly around with jet engines. This is also extremely unlikely, and relatively few people dispute that one may safely act on the assumption that what one observes is roughly equivalent to reality. It seems no less justifiable to incorporate mass intuition into one's code of ethics. In the end, all 'knowledge' is based upon certain unprovable assumptions - why must ethics be any different?
A Problem With Utilitarianism
While many philosophers reject the concept of utilitarianism as a guiding code of ethics, I think that it does have some value. It seems quite commonsensical to suppose that one person's life means less than the life of that person and one other. In fact, without any hint of utilitarianism, codes of ethics tend to fall to pieces.
However, utilitarianism is not suitable to serve as one's only source of ethical guidelines. The most significant reason I see for this is that it requires inaccessible knowledge in order to function correctly.
Utilitarianism attempts to quantify the moral value of states and actions by assigning levels of value to different things. For example, if one can do something that will make one person a little bit happy, or two people a little bit happy, one should do the latter. If one can do something that makes one person a little bit happy, or one person very happy, one should again do the latter. Unfortunately, while it is fairly easy to tell one person apart from two people, telling 'a little bit happy' apart from 'very happy' is more challenging. When one must guess at the exact values of states and actions, it becomes especially difficult - is it better to make three thousand people a little bit happy, or three thousand and one people a little bit happy, but slightly less happy than the three thousand mentioned previously? To make the correct moral judgement, one would have to know the exact difference in amount of happiness experienced by the two groups of people, and that is something which we cannot currently measure. This, in addition to other reasons, makes utilitarianism unsuitable as one's sole system of ethics.
However, utilitarianism is not suitable to serve as one's only source of ethical guidelines. The most significant reason I see for this is that it requires inaccessible knowledge in order to function correctly.
Utilitarianism attempts to quantify the moral value of states and actions by assigning levels of value to different things. For example, if one can do something that will make one person a little bit happy, or two people a little bit happy, one should do the latter. If one can do something that makes one person a little bit happy, or one person very happy, one should again do the latter. Unfortunately, while it is fairly easy to tell one person apart from two people, telling 'a little bit happy' apart from 'very happy' is more challenging. When one must guess at the exact values of states and actions, it becomes especially difficult - is it better to make three thousand people a little bit happy, or three thousand and one people a little bit happy, but slightly less happy than the three thousand mentioned previously? To make the correct moral judgement, one would have to know the exact difference in amount of happiness experienced by the two groups of people, and that is something which we cannot currently measure. This, in addition to other reasons, makes utilitarianism unsuitable as one's sole system of ethics.
Sunday, November 4, 2012
Q&A 6, Second Answer
My question is: Is there a point at which a human who, due to circumstances beyond their control (such as medical issues or living situation) causes a great amount of harm to other sentient creatures, should disregard their own health and/or life in order to cease causing that harm
I think that there is such a point. However, I think that point is so extreme that no such situation would be at all likely to arise. Some lesser situations of 'necessary evil' do arise, but I think that those cases do not approach the point mentioned above.
For example, if a person cannot cease eating meat and other animal products for reasons of health (as is the case for a few specific people), that person has the right to continue living. They should keep searching for alternative ways to meet their nutritional needs, but if they cannot do so they are not obligated to end their own lives by malnourishing themselves. I think that they have the right to do this for a number of reasons, first and foremost of which is that people have a right to self-preservation. Also significant is the fact that many (if not all) non-humans are lower on the sliding scale of sentience than are humans, and as such possess lesser moral value.
If, on the other hand, a person had (for example) to eat the brain of three dolphins dolphin every single day in order to survive, that person might be beyond the point I mentioned above. They might be obligated to die in order to cease causing the deaths of multiple highly sentient creatures on an ongoing basis. I am less certain that others would be justified in forcing them to make this decision - I will have to think further on that. Luckily, however, no such ailment exists to my knowledge.
I think that there is such a point. However, I think that point is so extreme that no such situation would be at all likely to arise. Some lesser situations of 'necessary evil' do arise, but I think that those cases do not approach the point mentioned above.
For example, if a person cannot cease eating meat and other animal products for reasons of health (as is the case for a few specific people), that person has the right to continue living. They should keep searching for alternative ways to meet their nutritional needs, but if they cannot do so they are not obligated to end their own lives by malnourishing themselves. I think that they have the right to do this for a number of reasons, first and foremost of which is that people have a right to self-preservation. Also significant is the fact that many (if not all) non-humans are lower on the sliding scale of sentience than are humans, and as such possess lesser moral value.
If, on the other hand, a person had (for example) to eat the brain of three dolphins dolphin every single day in order to survive, that person might be beyond the point I mentioned above. They might be obligated to die in order to cease causing the deaths of multiple highly sentient creatures on an ongoing basis. I am less certain that others would be justified in forcing them to make this decision - I will have to think further on that. Luckily, however, no such ailment exists to my knowledge.
Q&A 6, First Answer
My question is: What variables in sentient beings are morally relevant?
Quite a lot, I think. I am not necessarily qualified to provide a comprehensive list, certainly not without quite a lot of thought and debate with fellow ethics enthusiasts. That said, I think certain variables are especially important, and (perhaps as a result of this) are also more readily apparent. I can think of two in particular which stand out.
The first is the ability to feel pain, both physical and, in higher life forms, psychological. The more acutely and complexly a creature is able to feel pain, the more ethically problematic hurting or killing that creature becomes. Thus a shellfish, in spite of its biological status as an animal, has little to no moral value based on this variable. It has the same moral value as a plant, in fact. A mouse has far greater moral value, due to its ability to feel physical pain and psychological pain and panic. A human has still greater value, as it can feel all the same things that the mouse can, but with far more complexity.
The second is the ability to reflect on one's own existence. This one is trickier, as it is difficult to determine to exactly what extent various clearly sentient creatures are self-aware. Regardless of its detectability, however, I think that self-awareness is a relevant component of moral value - if one can reflect on the value of one's own life, then one can place value upon it independent of what it may possess upon its own.
Quite a lot, I think. I am not necessarily qualified to provide a comprehensive list, certainly not without quite a lot of thought and debate with fellow ethics enthusiasts. That said, I think certain variables are especially important, and (perhaps as a result of this) are also more readily apparent. I can think of two in particular which stand out.
The first is the ability to feel pain, both physical and, in higher life forms, psychological. The more acutely and complexly a creature is able to feel pain, the more ethically problematic hurting or killing that creature becomes. Thus a shellfish, in spite of its biological status as an animal, has little to no moral value based on this variable. It has the same moral value as a plant, in fact. A mouse has far greater moral value, due to its ability to feel physical pain and psychological pain and panic. A human has still greater value, as it can feel all the same things that the mouse can, but with far more complexity.
The second is the ability to reflect on one's own existence. This one is trickier, as it is difficult to determine to exactly what extent various clearly sentient creatures are self-aware. Regardless of its detectability, however, I think that self-awareness is a relevant component of moral value - if one can reflect on the value of one's own life, then one can place value upon it independent of what it may possess upon its own.
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