In response to Brandon Gaudet's post "Troll in the Dungeon, Werewolf in the Quad" (9/30/2012):
At the end of this post, you asked about whether humanity will ever get to a point where they can empirically observe all things, and thus confirm or dis-confirm without doubt the existence of immaterial phenomena, and if so, how will they know they have done so?
I doubt that humanity will ever reach such a point, and even if they do, I am quite certain that they will not know it. They may hypothesise that they know it, but in order to confirm it they would have to know everything, and I do not believe that will ever happen. I could, of course, be incorrect - that is a consequence of not knowing everything - but I think it is highly unlikely. It seems to contradict logic to suggest that one could know everything - would there not always be room for doubt? One could be absolutely certain about the status of everything in one's experience, but how could one know that nothing outside that experience exists? After all, such a thing would be outside one's experience and therefore one's knowledge. Thus, humanity will never be able to dis-confirm the theory that immaterial unicorns (or werewolves, as the case may be) cover every inch of the earth.
Sunday, September 30, 2012
Q&A 3, Second Answer
My question is: Are there some naturalistic or
superalnaturalistic viewpoints which this-world empiricism would actually contradict?
I think there are, but they are relatively few in number. Only theological viewpoints characterised by extremism or fanaticism, I believe, teach that this-world empiricism is definitively a lie. Some teach that one cannot know whether one's senses deceive one or not, but they at least leave the option open that one could be correct about what one perceives. For example, a person who believes in the existence of ghosts might think that a ghost constantly hovers above their head. According to them, however, the ghost is insubstantial, confined to a plane of existence other than this one. Thus, their belief does not contradict this-world empiricism, which simply says that the air above their head appears to be empty, a statement with which they would agree. An example of a statement which would actively contradict this-world empiricism would be if the aforementioned person claimed that the ghost above their head was quite substantial and visible, and everyone could see it.
I think there are, but they are relatively few in number. Only theological viewpoints characterised by extremism or fanaticism, I believe, teach that this-world empiricism is definitively a lie. Some teach that one cannot know whether one's senses deceive one or not, but they at least leave the option open that one could be correct about what one perceives. For example, a person who believes in the existence of ghosts might think that a ghost constantly hovers above their head. According to them, however, the ghost is insubstantial, confined to a plane of existence other than this one. Thus, their belief does not contradict this-world empiricism, which simply says that the air above their head appears to be empty, a statement with which they would agree. An example of a statement which would actively contradict this-world empiricism would be if the aforementioned person claimed that the ghost above their head was quite substantial and visible, and everyone could see it.
Q&A 3, First Answer
My question is: To what extent should schools attempt to teach morality?
This is a difficult question, because morality and faith are often quite entwined. In general, I think that schools should teach only the sort of morality that one can arrive at by reason, emotion, empathy, law, etc. - not by religion, atheism, or anything else which is theological in nature. Examples might be: do not hurt other students, do not steal, do not make fun of people for their theological viewpoints or for any other reason.
Rather than having teachers teach morals specific to a certain theological (or ideological, for that matter) viewpoint, guardians or institutions other than the public school system (such as Sunday schools) can choose to add on to the lessons students receive at school. Thus, if a parent wishes to teach a child that one should not consume animal products (either for spiritual or ideological reasons) or that one should not take the Lord's name in vain, they are perfectly free to do so, but they cannot expect the public school system to reinforce their lessons. Furthermore, if they wish to teach a child morals which contradict the morals the schools teach, the schools' morals must take precedence. This is because the schools should only be teaching a very basic level of morality, so that anything which contradicts it is obscure and irrational.
This is a difficult question, because morality and faith are often quite entwined. In general, I think that schools should teach only the sort of morality that one can arrive at by reason, emotion, empathy, law, etc. - not by religion, atheism, or anything else which is theological in nature. Examples might be: do not hurt other students, do not steal, do not make fun of people for their theological viewpoints or for any other reason.
Rather than having teachers teach morals specific to a certain theological (or ideological, for that matter) viewpoint, guardians or institutions other than the public school system (such as Sunday schools) can choose to add on to the lessons students receive at school. Thus, if a parent wishes to teach a child that one should not consume animal products (either for spiritual or ideological reasons) or that one should not take the Lord's name in vain, they are perfectly free to do so, but they cannot expect the public school system to reinforce their lessons. Furthermore, if they wish to teach a child morals which contradict the morals the schools teach, the schools' morals must take precedence. This is because the schools should only be teaching a very basic level of morality, so that anything which contradicts it is obscure and irrational.
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