Yes, I put three questions on my Q&A. The debate pitting free will against determinism is one of my favourite subjects in philosophy, and I could not contain my interest to merely two questions. My last question is: Does indeterminism open up a doorway for the
possibility of free will’s existence?
I do not think so, unless the indeterminism is both entirely random and universal. The concept of free will contradicts all empirical evidence and logic. It cannot rationally exist within the universe as humanity currently knows it. In fact, in order for free will to exist the universe would have to operate under entirely different laws.
Thus, in order for free will to exist, not only the matter in the universe but the laws of it as well would have to randomly change. I do not believe that this is the case. While the existence of indetermined elements of the physical universe, such as miniscule particles, seems perfectly feasible to me, the nonfixedness of universal laws seems less so. While fallibility is difficult to deny, it is also rather impractical to use as a basis for further inquiry into epistemology or metaphysics; thus, although I support the concept of fallibility overall, I also take for granted (or perhaps construct) a few base conditions about the nature of reality, for the sake of continuing inquiry and possible benefit, and the laws of physics are some of these. If I have any access to the actual nature of reality, then the laws of physics seem to me to hold true; either that or everything I have observed is a miraculous coincidence.
Sunday, October 28, 2012
Q&A 5, Second Answer
Essentially, my question is: How does determinism effect the concepts of harm and benefit?
Firstly, I am not sure yet if it does effect them. In all honesty, I hope that it does not; I think that harm and benefit are probably necessary for the existence of morality (personally, I think that they are all that is necessary) and as such their nonexistence would prove rather challenging to a relatively essential aspect of the world. However, if indeed determinism does invalidate harm and benefit, then of course it is better to be aware of this fact than to develop whole systems of morality based on false beliefs.
If determinism does invalidate harm and benefit, the only way I can imagine it doing so is that it deletes the possibility of any state of existence other than the existing one. If everything about the universe is determined, then things could not be otherwise than they are; thus, it might be impossible to legitimately compare an imagined (and impossible) state of being to an existent one. Can one, upon scraping one's knee, meaningfully say that one would be better off had one not done so? Or, given that the state of existence in which one did not scrape one's knee is and has always been impossible, is such a wish entirely meaningless?
I am still not sure about the answer to the above question. If one can meaningfully wish for things which cannot exist, then the concepts of harm and benefit are safe. If not, perhaps the idea of indeterminacy can preserve them.
Firstly, I am not sure yet if it does effect them. In all honesty, I hope that it does not; I think that harm and benefit are probably necessary for the existence of morality (personally, I think that they are all that is necessary) and as such their nonexistence would prove rather challenging to a relatively essential aspect of the world. However, if indeed determinism does invalidate harm and benefit, then of course it is better to be aware of this fact than to develop whole systems of morality based on false beliefs.
If determinism does invalidate harm and benefit, the only way I can imagine it doing so is that it deletes the possibility of any state of existence other than the existing one. If everything about the universe is determined, then things could not be otherwise than they are; thus, it might be impossible to legitimately compare an imagined (and impossible) state of being to an existent one. Can one, upon scraping one's knee, meaningfully say that one would be better off had one not done so? Or, given that the state of existence in which one did not scrape one's knee is and has always been impossible, is such a wish entirely meaningless?
I am still not sure about the answer to the above question. If one can meaningfully wish for things which cannot exist, then the concepts of harm and benefit are safe. If not, perhaps the idea of indeterminacy can preserve them.
Q&A 5, First Answer
My question is: Can the universe be partly determined and partly
indetermined?
I think so. The most common example of indeterminacy scientists bring up is that of the existence of miniscule particles, the movements of which may not be determined - that is, they may move randomly. If such particles exist and are scientifically measurable, it follows that they have at least some effect on other things; if they have no effect whatsoever, then how could anyone measure them, or even detect them for that matter? Thus, the existence of any one indetermined thing would necessarily make large portions of the universe, if not the entire universe, intermined in at least some respects.
However, even in such a case, I do not think that all elements of the universe would have to be indetermined. For example, let us examine the case of the aforementioned indetermined miniscule particles. The movement of these theoretical entities is random; there is no way to predict it. This does not mean that the particles are random in all respects. While one cannot tell whether they will move right or left, up or down, backwards or forwards, one can predict with certainty that they will not transform into walruses. So it is with all things in the universe, as far as humanity is currently aware. Whether or not some aspects of some (or all) things are random, other aspects are not. Thus, the existence of indeterminism does not utterly destroy the possibility of determinism.
I think so. The most common example of indeterminacy scientists bring up is that of the existence of miniscule particles, the movements of which may not be determined - that is, they may move randomly. If such particles exist and are scientifically measurable, it follows that they have at least some effect on other things; if they have no effect whatsoever, then how could anyone measure them, or even detect them for that matter? Thus, the existence of any one indetermined thing would necessarily make large portions of the universe, if not the entire universe, intermined in at least some respects.
However, even in such a case, I do not think that all elements of the universe would have to be indetermined. For example, let us examine the case of the aforementioned indetermined miniscule particles. The movement of these theoretical entities is random; there is no way to predict it. This does not mean that the particles are random in all respects. While one cannot tell whether they will move right or left, up or down, backwards or forwards, one can predict with certainty that they will not transform into walruses. So it is with all things in the universe, as far as humanity is currently aware. Whether or not some aspects of some (or all) things are random, other aspects are not. Thus, the existence of indeterminism does not utterly destroy the possibility of determinism.
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